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Abstract:  We describe and analyze five consecutive modes of governance in the Dutch social 
housing sector. We compare these institutional forms with the five policy values that the sector 
was assumed to realize. For that purpose we propose and use a new, analytical framework based 
on a separation principle that is applied to the coercion domain (the governance of transactions) 
as well as to the interaction domain (the welfare values). The consecutive modes of governance 
were introduced to cope with the changing welfare policies, but with varying results. In this paper 
we show that the implemented modes of governance in the Dutch social housing sector did not al-
ways realize the values that the sector was supposed to deliver. The framework we propose also 
facilitates the discussion about the concept of a social enterprise and the embedding of a service 
of general interest in the European Union. 
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1  Introduction  
 
In public administration one observes a fast expanding private domain and a retreating public 
domain. The extreme postmodernistic view (Frissen, 1999) holds that the classical, vertical 
democracy is transforming to a horizontal network society with continuous bargaining. Focus-
ing on the services providers, they prefer decentralized but powerful agencies – without trans-
parent checks and balances – to a politically controlled, authoritarian government. On the pro-
curement side, they see the system of vertical representation of service receivers – with estab-
lished political and democratic institutions – undermined and replaced by a process of perma-
nent, horizontal bargaining in a network society as the ultimate form of democracy. So the 
postmodernistic view adopts the bottom-up approach in contract formation. The philosophical 
school called contractualism
2 focuses on the analysis of contracts in some mode of govern-
ance, with its particular checks and balances. A contract may be an allegedly historical one or 
a tacitly implied one, or an imaginary one. It may be between people who set up a sovereign, 
or between the people and the sovereign, or between the individual and society or the state, or 
between hypothetical beings in a setting making for impartiality. It is a rational way to allo-
cate power. 
                                                 
1 We are very indebted to a referee for his/her perspective remarks, to the members of the International Scientific 
Commission “Public Services / Public Enterprises” of CIRIEC, to Eric van Damme and Pierre Larouche 
(TILEC) for their constructive comments.  
2 The idea goes back at least as far as Plato's Crito (c.395 BC), and contractualists (or contractarians) have also 
included Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), and vari-
ous modern writers.   2
 
In this paper we attempt to explain these observed trends by presenting a framework, in which 
welfare policies are separated from modes of governance. The institutional isomorphism me-
chanism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) explains that the institutional form of similar organiza-
tions converges to a mode of governance with norms and symbols that are relevant for all 
organizations in this class. Similarly, the discrete alignment principle (Williamson, 1991) 
explains  that  an  organization  selects  its  institutional  form  by  aligning  the  corresponding 
governance structure with its exchange characteristics. Since these legal characteristics and 
the  social  norms  and  symbols  belong  to  distinctive  institutions  that  are  finite  in  number 
(North, 1981), we consider discrete changes in governance. That offers an opportunity to de-
sign and test an efficient contracting hypothesis of a sort that has been introduced by William-
son in his Transaction Costs Economics (TCA). From economizing on transaction costs the 
comparative efficacy of alternative generic forms of governance can be determined. Where 
Williamson focuses on the production side of the economy, we follow Ruys (2005) in extend-
ing this approach by introducing modes of governance that are also applicable for consumer 
organizations. 
 
The Dutch housing corporations play a dominant role in the rented house market. Table 1 
partitions the housing market into three categories: social rented houses, private rented 











Netherlands  35  10  55 
Denmark  28  18  54 
Sweden  24  23  53 
UK  21  11  68 
France  18  20  62 
Finland  18  20  62 
Belgium  7  26  67 
Ireland  7  10  83 
Germany  6  50  44 
      Source: Norris and Shiels (2004) 
 
Table 1. Composition of the stock of houses 2001/2002 in percentages 
 
The more than 500 Dutch housing corporations own 2,4 million affordable houses for rent. 
They not only offer houses to low-income families, but also to middle and sometimes even to 
high income groups. So living in a social rented house in the Netherlands does not necessarily 
mean being poor. About 15% of the families receive a rent-subsidy, so the market share of 
social housing would shrink from 35% to 15% if only low-income families would be eligible. 
It also would mean stigmatization of that group, which was not politically acceptable. How-
ever, this policy turned out to be not only a very expensive solution, but also untenable in 
terms of consumers’ sovereignty. In short, the early successful governance of the housing 
sector in the years of housing shortage was not suited to cope with subsequent changes in 
technology and consumer preferences.  
   3
The next section presents the analytical framework for delineating modes of governance. Sec-
tion 3 presents a description of governance in the housing sector in five consecutive periods 
and assigns corresponding modes in the analytical framework. Section 4 gives a description of 
the consecutive welfare policies, and an assessment of the effects. Section 5 describes an im-
portant dimension of good governance: supervision in the social housing sector. The recent 
developments are stimulated by the change in the mode of governance. Section 6 concludes. 
   
2  Modes of governance 
 
2.1  Various approaches 
The impact of a mode of governance on the performance of an economy or of an organization 
is high on the research agenda of the professional economists. or the legal origins literature 
(see Dam, 2006), and of policy designing institutions as the World Bank. The purpose of this 
research is to predict the choice of an institutional arrangement and to test this prediction, 
before giving a normative advice. There is, however, not yet a full agreement about the mod-
eling of the governance framework or about an operational definition of the concept. The 
most influential definition is the contracting framework by Williamson (1985). The World 
Bank Institute, a research component of the World Bank, has developed an alternative gov-
ernance concept, which is closer to the legal approach in the discussion of the relationship 
between the rule of law and economic performance.  
 
The dominant line of thought in the school of New Institutional Economics (NIE) is based 
Williamson’s (1975) contracting framework. This paradigm is called Transaction Cost Eco-
nomics (TCE)
 3. It takes market contracting as the original state of affairs and considers cir-
cumstances where deviations from market transactions will economize on transaction costs. 
Williamson (1985) puts the mode of governance that is characterized by organizational hier-
archy at the other extreme from market contracting, and calls it vertical integration. That 
mode will be relatively more efficient with recurrent transactions, and when either investment 
are idiosyncratic (high asset specificity) and uncertainty is either high or medium, or when 
investments are mixed (medium asset specificity) and uncertainty is high. Governance mecha-
nisms that lie between these two extremes Williamson refers to as hybrid relationships. An-
other mode of governance in the TCE tradition develops Dixit (2003: 452), focusing “on the 
governance of economic transactions, that is, the enforcement of contracts … in large popula-
tions. … In my analysis, participation is voluntary, and only the flows that each side brings 
into transaction each period are at risk due to the other’s cheating.”  
 
In the NIE line of research, the World Bank Institute offers a model of ‘good’ governance. It 
identifies a set of governance indicators, broken down in six dimensions: voice and external 
accountability; political stability and lack of violence; crime and terrorism; government effec-
tiveness; lack of regulatory burden; rule of law; and control of corruption.  
 
                                                 
3 Others have examined the enforcement of property rights. Within the property rights based theory of the firm, 
an organization is characterized by ownership over assets. Grossman and Hart (1986) define ownership by resid-
ual rights of control. Consequently, the type or the identity of the owners determines the organization’s objective 
and form. The transaction approach takes instead the type of transaction as determinant of the organization’s 
form. See also Hart and Moore (2006).   4
2.2  Ordering modes of governance 
 
In this paper we apply a theory developed by Ruys (2005), which is essentially a TCE ap-
proach. A transaction is a relation between two contracting parties: a principal (or procurer) 
and an agent (or provider); it is the carrier of a service to be delivered and it determines the 
mode of the exchange value. The principals of a transaction determine the contents and pay 
the price; and the agents (or providers) deliver the agreed contents. Procurers or providers are 
groups of people and called parties. We assume that there is one dominant transaction charac-
teristic: the degree of coercion on the members of a contracting party that is required for that 
party to manage and deliver its part of the agreement. It stretches from coercion of all mem-
bers of a party by force of public law, to which the highest index is assigned, to voluntary 
transactions with index 1. The party with the highest index is the whole society or the ‘grand 
coalition’: a single set. The other extreme is a party with index 1, an independent individual, 
of which there are as many as there are members in the society. So the two-dimensional or-
dering principle for types of transactions is based on the assumption that the degree of coer-
cion is proportional to the size of the two contracting parties, where each party is empowered 
by and commits all and only its members. A transaction that is identified by this principle we 
call a base transaction, which has to be specified by complementary transactions. 
 
We further assume each type of transaction requires a legal environment, a kind of ‘constitu-
tion’ to specify behavioral rules and balancing procedures. One may think of allotting voting 
rights and designing voting procedures, or the protection of ownership rights, and/or the pre-
vention of abusing market dominance (Article 82 of the EU treaty). Such a constitution con-
tains micro procedures for arriving at a decision on the individual organizational level using 
social norms and symbols. These provide for legitimacy and helps organizations, for example, 
to  cope  with  uncertainty  by  imitating  their  peers,  as  observed  by  DiMaggio  and  Powell 
(1983). On the macro level, the external organization, it also contains legally supported eco-
nomic procedures for obtaining consistency between transactions and efficiency in society, 
such as arriving at a balance between parties, determining the exchange value between them, 
such as a market price; and implementing the agreement. In line with DiMaggio and Powell, 
we assume that organizations under a given constitution are homogeneous in functions and 
roles, as they are shaped by a broad set of similar institutional influences. This is the mecha-
nism  of  institutional  isomorphism,  which  is  effective  through  the  influence  of  the  macro 
norms and symbols. Another type of pressure may come from economic competition between 
modes of governance or from evolutionary economics rationales
4.  
 
The ‘transactional constitution’ aims at supporting specific types of transactions in society. 
We assume that there exists for each base transaction a unique mode of governance that sup-
ports the mode of transaction in society, how complicated it may be. An organization is called 
a hybrid if it is governed by two or more modes of governance
5. The mode of governance 
does not specify the terms of exchange, but only refers to the power base of the transaction 
parties involved. That defines a one-to-one mapping from the transaction space onto the space 
of governance modes. So the ordering principle for the set of governance modes is derived 
from the ordering principle of the set of base transactions.  
 
                                                 
4 The emergence of a mode of governance is studied elsewhere; see Dam (2006), Dixit (2005), Greif (1993), 
Ménard (2004) and other authors; see e.g. Ventoruzzo (2006) for regulatory competition. 
5 The assumption implies that the modes of governance are pure, i.e., a mode supports one and only one mode of 
base transaction. Hybrid organizations are analyzed in Ruys (2006). Ménard (2004) focuses on the Williamson 
hybrids.   5
2.3  Modes of governance with coercion indexes 
For the problem of analyzing governance in the social housing sector, we need for the parties 
involved a minimum of three modes. For each party we define a group empowerment index 
from 3 (full coercion, public law) to 1 (voluntary, private law). The set of governance modes 
contains thus nine fields, each containing a basic transaction. These are represented in Table 
1. The bottom row in Table 1 represents decentralization of procurer-decisions, where inde-
pendent, small procurers are faced with different types of providers. These procurers may be 
households that offer their savings on capital markets, or customers on a competitive market, 
or customers on a monopolistic market, or voters in an election for the national executive.  
Their transactions are supported in the modes, respectively, (1,1) or (1,2) or (1,3). Williamson 
restricts himself to arrangements according to private law, which are the modes (1,1) and (1,2) 
and the mode in-between, which he calls, respectively, the market mode, vertical integration, 
and hybrids. Williamson does not consider the modes for fully integrated provision (1,3) that 
require a central decision mechanism, a public authority and public law, neither integration on 
the part of procurers or consumers, the vertical dimension in Table 1. The last column in Ta-
ble 1 represents decentralization of the provider- or production-decisions, allowing for com-
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Table 1. Modes of governance with coercion (or group empowerment) indexes 
 
 
Integrating procurers or users from the bottom row up makes them a group of stakeholders of 
an organization. The group-coherence may be voluntary, such as a cooperative or an alliance, 
indicating mode (2,1). If public law applies, the procurer is a public entity serving as a princi-
pal for small firms. This we call the Public-outsourcing mode (3,1) for small firms. Integrat-
ing providers from the right to the left increases the scale, the scope, or the time period of a 
transaction. A (Rousseau) transaction between the legislative and the executive of a society is 
a transaction between a fully centralized procurer and a fully centralized provider: mode (3,3). 
The non-profits and social enterprise systems are situated in (2,2), which is the domain where 
cooperation is not based on coercive public law.  
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Since the mode (2,2) is called here the social enterprise system, it is illustrative to check 
whether the dimensions defining a social enterprise meet the characteristics of the mode in-
troduced here. Defourny (2001) and Defourny and Nyssens (2006) give a definition in terms 
of activities, which term we interpret as resulting from transactions. They provide the follow-
ing four criteria for the economic and managerial dimensions of a social enterprise activity:  
-  a continuous activity, producing and selling goods and/or services; 
-  a high degree of autonomy; 
-  a significant level of economic risk; 
-  a minimum amount of paid work. 
The social dimensions are captured by five criteria: 
-  an explicit aim to benefit the community; 
-  an initiative launched by a group of citizens; 
-  decision-making power not based on capital ownership; 
-  a participatory nature, which involves the various parties affected by the activity; 
-  limited profit distribution. 
As for the social dimensions, these belong evidently to the procurer group with coercion index 
2 and to the providers’ group with index 2 (or 3). The first economic criterion requires selling 
goods, which belongs to providers’ coercion index 2 (or 1); a minimum of paid work excludes 
procurers’ index 1. So, indeed, mode (2,2) dominates when modes of governance are assigned 
to the criteria defining a social enterprise. 
De Ru e.a. (2005) propagates to incorporate the ‘social enterprise’ in the Dutch law system. 
They define it as an enterprise incorporated under private law, with considerable autonomy, 
aiming at a social goal, and with profits only destined for its mission. Missing in both defini-
tions, however, is a system of checks and balances that is vital for performing in the context 
of an interdependent economy. 
 
The modes of governance in the last column and the lowest row – the grey colored fields of 
the Table 1 – are suited for decentralized, independent individual decision-making, by procur-
ers and/or by providers. That allows for (quasi-) market modes, on the demand and/or on the 
supply side, in which the economic allocative efficiency criterion can be applied. Money is an 
excellent instrument for decentralizing power, although a centralized force is needed to regu-
late the markets. The other modes are characterized by societal or group decision-making in 
the social and political domain, required for non-voluntary transactions in realizing equity and 
social values. The focus on the set of decentralizable modes corresponds with the so-called 
Anglo-Saxon model of governance model; the focus on the other modes corresponds with the 
Rhineland model. Both models are shown to be complementary in our approach.  
 
2.4  Transaction costs and tradeoffs 
Since the exercise of power on individual members of a group overrules individual circum-
stances and preferences, it has negative welfare effects. So the cost of a mode of governance 
is proportional to the degree of coercion applied, which is again proportional to the size of 
any party in the transaction. This transaction cost ordering defines a tradeoff between the 
various modes of governance. Integration of some party implies less freedom of choice for the 
composing parts (higher organization or welfare costs), if it is not necessary for the chosen 
service. Liberalization of a party implies more freedom of choice for the composing parts 
(higher welfare and lower organizational costs), and is cheaper if this decentralization of deci-
sions is technological feasible. Integration may be necessary, however, for providing services 
with a higher degree of interaction and resulting welfare. So the tradeoff between two feasible 
modes of governance is determined by the change in welfare benefits and organizational costs   7
caused by a change in a mode of governance. Benefits and feasibility are subjects of Section 
4.  
 
Williamson designs a mapping from the transaction space into the modes of governance space 
His theory predicts that an organization will align to a specific mode of governance when the 
transactions in which that organization is involved have specific characteristics. The key di-
mensions of uncertainty, frequency of occurrence, and asset-specificity identify these charac-
teristics. This theory can be tested empirically
6 and is called the efficient contracting hypothe-
sis. Williamson’s mode of Vertical Integration, for example, will be relatively more efficient 
with recurrent transactions, and when either investments are idiosyncratic (high asset specific-
ity) and uncertainty is either high or medium, or when investments are mixed (medium asset 
specificity) and uncertainty is high. In this paper we deviate from Williamson’s model in two 
ways. First, we have extended the choice of contracting in this paper to providers and procur-
ers. Secondly, we have defined a mode of governance by a type of transactions.  So we cannot 
assess efficiency without extending the model with welfare dimensions. Before doing so in 
Section 4, we describe the various modes of governance that were in force in the Dutch social 
housing sector. 
 
3  Consecutive modes of governance in the housing sector 
Modes of governance belong to the organizational domain. They interact with welfare poli-
cies, but we treat them separately in order to analyze which mode of governance is used for 
which type of welfare policy. In this section we assign modes of governance mentioned in 
Table 1 to consecutive periods. The reference set – the grand coalition – is the community of 
Dutch citizens. That community or appropriate subsets enter into transactions to manage the 
social housing sector. Five consecutive periods are distinguished, each offering a different 
solution. We simplify matters by identifying the dominant type of transaction for each period. 
 
3.1  Private social enterprises (1850-1940) 
In the 19
th century, it was private initiative that established housing corporations in the Neth-
erlands. The legal form was a cooperative association with membership established under 
private law, aimed at improving the miserable housing conditions of workers in the cities. It is 
typical for the Dutch society that their roots stem from private, civil initiative and not from a 
public authority on any level. At that time, society was organized along the lines of the so-
called ‘pillars’, the vertically integrated social groups, such as the Socialists, the Roman-
Catholics, and the Protestants, who take care of the needy in their ‘pillar’ for all aspects of 
life: housing, health, youth and education. Although in the Dutch tradition the interaction be-
tween procurers (principals) and providers (executive agents) in determining a decision 
(transaction) is strong, that did not mean that organization was hybrid or that the agent was 
sitting on the chair of the principal! In 1902, a political consensus was reached to transpose 
some responsibility to the central government. According to the Woningwet (Housing Law), 
the government subsidizes a social housing association if it has received the status of toege-
laten instelling (admitted institution). The government marginally subsidized deficits due to 
the fact that the group of tenants cannot afford market-determined rents.  
 
Mode of governance (2,2): 
                                                 
6 Carter and Hodgson (2006) observe however, that the empirical evidence does not decisively support William-
son’s theory; so further research is necessary.   8
A corporation was owned and financed by a group of stakeholders belonging to one of the 
social groups that partitioned the Dutch society. In 1902, the government joined the group of 
stakeholders. So from the procurer’s view, it is the mode of row index 2 in Table 1. The social 
housing was provided by some producer cooperation: column index 2.   
 
3.2   Central planning: reconstruction and mass production (1945-1965) 
After the Second World War, the government assumed the role of a housing procurer and 
developer to beat “peoples’ enemy nr.1”. Central administration and regulation was developed 
to enhance the number of houses built each year. These conditions also included severe price- 
and rent controls. The powerful instrument for this goal was the full financing of the housing 
projects, formally by means of subsidies, and by determining the conditions for these subsi-
dies. In 1948, the Marshall plan brought sizeable financial support to reinvigorate the Euro-
pean economies, and allowed for experimental production methods to decrease building time 
and costs.  
The reconstruction started from a national governmental network, in which the municipalities 
played an important role. There was no role for the housing corporations, other than managing 
daily operations. The influence of the housing corporations grew in time. In the sixties, the 
unions of housing corporations (“centrales”) were successful in their intermediation with the 
government to bunch together separate corporation contingents of houses to be built into re-
gional contingents, which increased building streams. 
 
Mode of governance (3,3): 
All social housing projects were financed and strictly regulated by the government: row index 
3 in Table 1. Although the government did not own the housing corporations, the actual 
power was in the hands of the government. The central government took over the responsibil-
ity for the provision of social housing – column 3 in Table 1 – and delegated only the man-
agement functions to the corporations. 
 
3.3  The corporation as government agency (1965-1993) 
The end of the harsh housing shortage ended the task of the state and the government wanted 
to shift responsibility to the corporations to listen better to the tenants’ wishes. A gradual 
process of decentralization was implemented and in 1965 the housing corporations regained 
their status as project developers, but under strict central regulation. The municipal conditions 
for social housing loans and contributions were standardized. Although the municipalities 
were obliged to call in the corporations for designing building plans, the municipalities in the 
big cities were not eager to follow this route. Only a minority of the housing corporations 
were involved in the preparation and procurement of municipal building projects. As a conse-
quence of her regulatory involvement, the housing budget of the central government increased 
from ¼LQWR¼ELOOLRQLQRIWKHVWDWHEXGJHW 
 
Mode of governance (3,2): 
Social housing projects were still financed and strictly regulated by the government – row 
index 3 in Table 1 – although the government did not own the housing corporations. The cen-
tral government delegated responsibility for the provision and the management of social hous-
ing again to the social housing corporations: column index 2 in Table 1. 
   9
3.4  Liberalizing and quasi-privatizing the corporations (1993-2005) 
In order to relieve the state budget from the ever increasing burden caused by the social hous-
ing expenditures there was a political agreement to decentralize also the financial responsibil-
ity and procurement to the corporations. Government failures and the increasing belief in the 
efficiency of market forces made such a change in governance possible. In 1993 the govern-
ment terminated subsidizing the housing corporations and the corporations  received  inde-
pendence from detailed central government regulation. A watershed forms the “bruteringsre-
gel”, a capital clearing operation in 1995. It was agreed that all payback obligations for loans 
received by the corporations (¼ELOOLRQZHUHFOHDUHGZLWKDOOJRYHUQPHQWDOVXEVLG\REOLJa-
tions (¼ ELllion), such as the yearly costs of long term loans and the contributions in the 
exploitation. That was the end of the system of financial state intervention in the social hous-
ing sector. The much weaker instruments of influencing and self-regulation followed it. Cor-
porations were from now on allowed to engage in market activities for their own profit and 
risk. However, they were not privatized and a ‘destination obligation’ rests on the non-profit 
assets, which means government control. 
The idea was to create the social housing corporation as a carrier of social enterprise in which 
both private entrepreneurship and the provision of social goals are supposedly combined. All 
non-core activities, that is, activities not mentioned in the BBSH
7, have to be managed in 
separate legal entities and are subject to corporate tax.  
The number of corporations (the number of municipal corporations) decreased in this period 
from 600 (21) in 2002 to 526 (18) in 2005. Their employment rose from 22,444 to 26,000. 
 
Hybrid modes of governance (3,2), (2,2) and (2,1): 
The housing corporations faced strict regulation by the government for social housing projects 
– row index 3 in Table 1 – but for the private, non-core activities the procurement power went 
to the housing corporations: row index 2 in Table 1.The type of provider for the corporation 
was extended to providing on the private market: column 1 in Table 1. The hybrid form of 
governance made the housing corporation a hybrid organization. 
 
The chosen modes of governance did not, however, specify the procurement side of the base 
core and non-core transactions satisfactorily. If the government withdraws from her role of 
procurer, who did take her place and legitimized the social activities of the social corporation? 
If eventually losses on non-core transactions exceeded the value of the free assets, could the 
social corporation go bankrupt? It was understood that internal supervision should substitute 
government supervision
8. Most housing corporations changed their legal status from a coop-
erative association with members to a foundation, which increased their independence from 
corporation members and their strategic powers
9. This process of becoming independent was 
at the height in 2004, when the government handed over all houses that were until then only 
managed and exploited by the corporations. The understanding was that the sector would not 
be subsidized any more and would take care itself of the construction and management of 
houses suited for social rented houses. A group called NTMO
10 formulated the idea that pub-
lic tasks should be executed with the least possible regulation and social tasks as close as pos-
                                                 
7 Besluit Beheer Sociale Huurwoningen (BBSH), a ministerial directive from 1993, giving rules of behaviour for 
a social corporation that is a toegelaten instellingen, an organization formally accepted by the government. 
8 In 1995 the Commission Glasz, installed by large housing corporations, presented a pioneering report on inter-
nal supervision of housing corporations, called Naar professioneel toezicht. 
9 In ‘t Veld (1997) was an influential proponent of hybridization and pleaded for a legal embedding. 
10 Netwerk Toekomst Maatschappelijke Ondernemingen ( NTMO), De waarde van de maatschappelijke onder-
neming geborgd, 2003. Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR), Omgaan met overmaat. De 
vermogens van de corporaties als sturingsopgave, 2003.    10
sible to the group receiving the services, in 2003. The WRR (2003) added softly that a pure 
model of self-regulation is not desirable: corporations have always to be accountable to the 
political domain and to society as a whole.  
 
In 2005, EU-Commissioner Mrs. Neelie Kroes sent a letter to the Dutch government in which 
she urged the Dutch corporations to comply with the competition rules of the EU. The hybrid 
form chosen above did not guarantee a correct separation between the provision of marketable 
services from the desired services of general interest. That was – surprisingly – a surprise for 
the Dutch government and parliament. The hybrid form had more disadvantages. Although 
the previous policy indeed resulted in an increase in high quality private house building, it 
also caused stagnation in the social house building. The Minister wanted to ‘seduce’ the cor-
porations to invest more in unprofitable social housing. A new rental bill, Huurwet 2006, the 
Rent bill 2006 was introduced, according to which the house rents were slightly liberalized 
against the promise of the corporations (i) to invest more in social housing projects and (ii) 
using parts of the increased rents to compensate specific tenants. They ought to do so volun-
tary, based on their responsibility as a ‘Social Enterprise’. If imposed by law, these comple-
mentary measures – confirming the hybrid construction – could make the bill politically vi-
able. 
 
The fall of the government has prevented the Rent bill 2006 to become a law. That very cau-
tious attempt to liberalize the social housing market was postponed for some time. Since the 
government gives now individual rent subsidies
11 rather than subsidizing the corporations, it 
has not too much interest in liberalization. That makes it hard or impossible for the corpora-
tions to develop a long term business strategy. Secondly, the privatized corporations have no 
privileged admission any more to local building lots. Large private project-developers buy out 
farmers for future building lots and the thus create scarcity, which causes stagnation and dis-
equilibrium in the housing market; notably the ‘starters’ in the housing market find them-
selves in a difficult position. That problem was aggravated by the ban to build houses in the 
designated rural areas. 
 
We have mentioned above a power gap in this hybrid form of governance. That has been 
filled up by the Boards of Directors of the corporations, who were covered by the networks 
they indirectly command. The effect of this development is ambiguous: some corporations 
provide excellent services; others become inert. The results of the corporations and the fact 
that the role of supervision is now under scrutiny, indicates that this aspect of governance is 
not quite satisfactory resolved. This is the subject of the Sections 4.4 and 5.  
3.5  A social enterprise (2005 - …) 
The future form of governance of the Dutch social housing sector is still under discussion. 
Important government advisors as the SER and the WRR are in favor of a hybrid form. But 
the social enterprise may possibly emerge as a more satisfactory and transparent mode of 
governance. 
 
                                                 
11 An OECD report “Economic survey of the Netherlands 2004, Housing Policies” made very critical remarks on 
the Dutch rent policy. It says that the system of rent subsidies performs badly because tenants remain too long in 
a cheap house. The OECD proposes to adapt the rents gradually to the level of the rents in the free housing mar-
ket.   11
4  Types of welfare policies 
4.1  Ordering values, services and welfare policies 
A welfare policy specifies societal values and assigns institutional forms to achieve these 
goals. In our approach the institutional form can be analyzed and predicted from a given value 
or policy-goal by separating the value domain from the governance domain. Where the gov-
ernance domain with procurers and providers has been treated above, we focus now on the 
services delivered by performers and to receivers and generating values. There are many types 
of services and values, which are hard to compare. The unifying criterion we apply is based 
on the characteristics of the two interactive groups of people who – by delivering a service – 
create the value. Since we want to identify values by these two groups, it follows that the val-
ues considered here are restricted to behavioral and operational values
12. We define a service 
as a relation between two groups of people, a club of receivers and a team of performers. The 
interaction between the club and the team generates a personal value. The personal value 
corresponds in some specific context to the utility of a service for that person, or to a user 
value.  
We assume that each club and each team in a service relation consists of all and only mem-
bers who interact. So a club – or a team – internalizes all interaction between its members and 
all clubs are externally independent. Clubs – and teams – can therefore be ordered according 
to their size or, equivalently, according to their degree of interaction in society, which we call 
the interaction index. One extreme is the interaction between all members of society, with a 
maximal interaction index; the other extreme is a set of independent singles, externally fully 
independent, with a minimal interaction index. So separation of interaction defines the two-
dimensional ordering of services and personal values of the service. Invoking the isomor-
phism mechanism again, we define a type of service by the condition that the interaction in-
dex for the club served, and for the team engaged, is the same for all organizations delivering 
this service. The number of types is therefore finite. Services of the same type may have dif-
ferent contents. 
A typical size is not an exact magnitude, but it indicates typical boundaries of interaction, a 
minimal mass and a maximal stretch for the internal coherence of a club or of team, which 
itself is identified by a set of characteristic values and standards. A typical service may be 
complemented by a set of specific services.  
 
4.2  Types of services related to social housing  
Now we simplify matters by identifying only three types of services and corresponding val-
ues: a minimum needed to describe services in the social housing sector. This is the service 
map of Table 2. A type of personal value in a welfare policy is identified by the type of ser-
vice with interaction-partners generating that value: 
1.  A single group with a nation-wide comprehensive values; interaction index 3; 
2.  Groups with professional or community values; interaction index 2; 
3.  Many groups with particular values; interaction index 1. 
                                                 
12 The European Values Study (2005) identifies long-term values such as the value of family, work, friends, 
religiosity, tolerance, solidarity, confidence, obedience and work ethos, post-materialism, etcetera. These values 
are aggregated into two independent dimensions: normative/religious and personal autonomy / individual free-
dom. Since values are rather stable over time, they can characterize a country on the cultural map. Hofstede 
(1980), using the dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, femininity, and individualism, has per-
formed a similar research.   12
So the degree of interaction required for teams is smaller when going from the left to the right 
and for clubs when going from the top to the bottom of the table. The top row contains ser-
vices for the whole society by teams with internal interaction of varying size. That includes 
the Services of General Interest (SGI) and the Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI). 
The column with index 3 contains values for clubs of varying size by the whole community, 
which has to support services as constitutional norms and rules, or care for safety and envi-
ronment. The column with index 1 contains services for clubs of varying size by many small 
teams, which are therefore comparable and measurable in outputs, allowing for defining com-
petition, economic efficiency, and market prices. Economic services belong typically to this 
category. The row with index 2 contains social services as Services of Social Interest (SSI) 
and Services of Social Economic Interest (SSEI). The row with index 1 contains services for 
many independent, small clubs, which are therefore comparable and measurable in service 
appreciation, allowing for defining utility functions (public, local public and standard) and for 
applying methodological individualism and the Pareto optimality concept. One may notice 




















                    © Ruys 
Table 2. The service map: typology of services and values, with indexes 
 
 
Two welfare principles span this framework. The solidarity principle implies interaction in the 
whole society and is therefore a community value in the left-upper corner: services going in 
that direction are usually more equitable. The efficiency principle focuses on individual val-
ues and goes to the right-lower corner.  
 
 
4.3  Consecutive welfare policies for social housing  
In this section we identify the goals set in consecutive welfare policies in the Netherlands’ 
social housing sector. For carrying out a correct analysis it is essential not to use institutional 
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values   13
two domains, which separation is required for choosing the best managerial instrument for 
achieving a given goal.  
·  1850 – 1940: Improving housing conditions for the poor.  
The housing corporations were a carrier for offering housing facilities to poor families by co-
workers of the corporation. The type of receivers is the group (or ‘club’) of poorly housed, 
low income families belonging to some social group in society, so row index 2 applies. The 
performer is the professional team of housing experts, column index 2, which is engaged by 
an corporation. That is: 
Welfare policy (2,2). 
 
·  1945 – 1965: Reconstruction and mass production  
The service required now was to reconstruct houses for all citizens with the shortest delay. 
The consequence was a sober and standardized construction scheme. The revival of the build-
ing industry took much more time than was expected at the start. Building emergency livings 
and duplex houses solved the most cutting problems. The housing-shortage became a first 
priority for the country and dominated the political agenda for many years.  
The type of receiver was (i) the whole population, calling for solidarity to beat “peoples’ en-
emy nr.1” and for stability in performance, and (ii) as a subgroup the badly housed families. 
The government let its agencies and the corporations assume the role of performer of the ser-
vice. That is: 
Welfare policy (3,2). 
 
The massive, centrally planned production led to monotonous blocks of housing units and 
produced eventually malcontent tenants. The consumers wanted their wishes for diversifica-
tion and variety to be recognized separately from the general interest. Since the housing short-
age was over, a new policy was desired.  
 
·  1965 – 1993: Diversification and more variety 
Society as a whole (row index 3) was still a type of receivers of the government’s housing 
services performed by the corporations (column index 2). But serving the varying interests of 
the club of tenants and their neighborhood (row index 2) became an independent type of re-
ceivers for the housing corporations (column index 2). So there appeared two types of ser-
vices in the housing sector:  
Welfare policy: (3,2) and (2,2) 
 
The end of the basic housing shortage should also mean the end of government involvement 
in the housing sector. But abolishing the rights on housing and rents, established in the previ-
ous period, was politically infeasible. So the government service of regulating rents for social 
housing and subsidizing some individuals for costs of housing remained. The corporations’ 
professional team services were expanded and liberated, with the core-activities delineated.    
 
·  1993 – 2005: Higher quality: partly liberalizing social housing 
One type of receiver in the housing sector was society as a whole (row index 3) receiving an 
income policy and peace on the rent-front; this service was performed by the government 
(column index 3). The other type of service aims at the social club of eligible members of a 
corporation and neighbors (row index 2), with the housing corporations’ professional team as 
the type of performer (column index 2). That team was also performing private housing ser-
vices to other tenants, not members of the social club mentioned above (row index 1).  
Welfare policies: (3,3), (2,2) and (1,2)   14
 
The corporations are expanding their social activities to other domains, overlapping the ser-
vices of neighboring corporations (and therefore competing with them). They also expand 
their private services and sell their free assets (and therefore competing with private firms).  
 
·  2005 – …: Fully liberalizing with a Service of Social Interest?  
The type of services mentioned above are expanded with a new one: the receivers are non-
members of the corporation (column index 1), with the housing corporations’ professional 
team as the type of performer (column index 2). 
Welfare policy: (3,3), (2,2), (1,2) and (2,1) 
 
4.4  Confrontation: the efficient contracting hypothesis revisited 
The separation of the value domain from the institutional domain allows for choosing the 
mode of governance for achieving a given type of service or goal in a welfare policy. That 
separation is also the fundament of the efficient contracting hypothesis, by which we can pre-
dict the choice of a mode of governance. We call a mode of governance a feasible mode for a 
type of service if it assigns sufficient power to the contracting parties to realize that type of 
service, that is, if the team contains the set of performers and the club contains the set of re-
ceivers of that type of service. So the mode (3,3) is feasible for all types of service, whereas 
the mode (1,1) is feasible only for the type of service (1,1). We call a mode of governance an 
efficient mode if it is feasible and requires the least power for the contracting parties to real-
ize. When this criterion is applied to the Sections 4.2 and 3, we can conclude that in the first 
three time periods an efficient mode of governance has been chosen. Problems arise in the 
privatization mode, which have not been solved yet in the last mode of the corporation as a 
social enterprise. 
 
·  1850 – 1940: Improving housing conditions for the poor 
The group of receivers belonged to the social group (or ‘pillar’) that included the stakeholders 
of the service, who identified themselves with the receivers. The group of performers was 
engaged by the corporation, the provider of the service. So mode (2,2) contains service type 
(2,2) and is feasible. It is also efficient. 
Therefore, the type of service desired (2,2) is governed efficiently by mode (2,2). 
 
·  1945 – 1965: Reconstruction and mass production 
Again, the type of service desired (3,2) is governed by mode (3,3), which implies too much 
central government involvement. 
 
·  1965 – 1993: Diversification and more variety 
Two new types of service was desired (3,2) and (2,2), for which the new mode of governance 
was (3,2) was constructed. This mode is efficient for service (3,2) and feasible for service 
(2,2). But in the end it did not make true the expectations as formulated in the welfare policy.   
 
·  1993 – 2005: Higher quality: partly liberalizing social housing 
The expanding activities (3,3), (2,2) and (1,2) were covered by the modes (3,2), (2,2) and 
(2,1), which is not a perfect match. The administrative policy
13 to build houses in a limited 
number of large locations near the big cities: the so-called VINEX locations were accom-
plished, but the construction of social housing stagnated almost completely. Services of social 
                                                 
13 De VIerde Nota ruimtelijke ordening EXtra (VINEX), or the fourth report on spatial ordening (1995).    15
interest (SSI) were formulated, but not supported by a transaction. The government’s inten-
tion was that – after the ownership of all assets was shifted to the corporations – the housing 
corporations should continue building houses for the lower income categories, possibly ex-
tending their market to higher categories, and better oriented at the consumers’ taste. The cen-
tral government had in mind that the corporations were rich enough to cover the losses due to 
its rent policy, which policy remained intact. The government took the position that the man-
agement of these corporations should have internalized the external effects of housing corpo-
rations. The complex positioning of emancipated social housing corporations as social enter-
prises with a partial autonomy and strong dependence on governmental regulations seems to 
be a cause of the actual stagnation in the social housing sector. The hybrid character of hous-
ing corporations has resulted in a high degree of autonomy for strategic development, but also 
in a low degree of transparency. Some have used this autonomy to start new, sometimes sur-
prising initiatives, such as taxi services and art lending, but they are gradually converging to 
either assuming responsibility for the livability of the districts in which their target groups live 
or to inertia (see Perotti, 2002).  
 
·  2005 – …: Fully liberalizing with a Service of Social Interest? 
Even more services are now taken up by the social housing corporations: (3,3), (2,2), (1,2) 
and (2,1). The modes of governance are still in discussion.  
 
Public tasks should be executed with the least possible regulation. Tasks should be close to 
the group aimed at by the organization, according to the providers of public-sector organiza-
tions
14. Social enterprises should succeed in situations where the free market mechanism fails. 
These enterprises have no need to fall back on bureaucratic or public law enforced mecha-
nisms associated with government intervention. The Scientific Government Council (WRR, 
2003) is in favor of a social enterprise, but adds that it should always be accountable to soci-
ety. They think that a model of pure self-regulation is not feasible, neither desirable. That is 
why supervision has become a central issue. 
 
 
5  Supervision in the Dutch social housing sector 
 
The institute ‘housing corporation’ is a vehicle of social enterprise by which both (market 
oriented) entrepreneurship and achieving social goals are supposed to be realized. The actual 
surplus of capital assets in possession of the housing corporations offers new possibilities for 
society. The social legitimacy of the decisions made by the housing corporations are, how-
ever, questionable. There are at least two bottlenecks in spending the allocating the surplus of 
assets. Firstly, a so-called bestemmingsplicht, destination obligation, rests on the assets. So 
the resources can only be used in the interest of social housing and the housing corporations 
have not these funds at their free disposal. Various public authorities now try to use this re-
striction by imposing at will obligations on the corporations. The verzelfstandiging or eman-
cipation of the corporations, however, is inconsistent with this strategy. Secondly, there exists 
a legitimate expectation from the side of the government that the corporations should support 
                                                 
14 Netwerk Toekomst Maatschappelijke Onderneming (2003), De waarde van de maatschappelijke onderneming 
geborgd.  A critical analysis of the social housing sector gives Hof e.a. (2006). They suggest economically viable 
solutions for securing public interests in the housing market and observe that short-term political motives form a 
serious obstacle for a sound long-term solution. Ruys (2003) has also pleaded for designing strong modes of 
governance for the growth and distribution of social welfare rather than seeking protection in a hybrid labyrinth. 
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the public authorities to fulfill their social tasks. That task need not to be outsourced and 
bought as a service of general economic interest (SGEI), but can be formulated as a service of 
social interest (SGI or SSI) based on the destination obligation on the assets of the corpora-
tions. So there exists a public and legal framework to solve this bottleneck. A general opinion 
is growing that “the richness” of housing corporations, having its roots in the social sector, 
must be used for social purposes.  
 
There exists a large variety in housing corporations, but they have one common denominator: 
they consider themselves social enterprises. A social enterprise is a private organization with 
a public-sector task. Their claim is based on being granted by the government the position of 
‘admitted institution’, toegelaten instelling, according to the Housing Law (Woningwet, Ww) 
of 1901. That recognition implied rights and duties for the corporation. Instead of a strict de-
scription of the tasks to be fulfilled with the state’s subsidy, the corporation was allowed to 
own houses and to make profits but it faced the condition that its working capital could only 
be used in the service of the people’s housing. So legally the assets belong to the corporation, 
but economically the corporation has no full freedom to dispose of these assets. These assets 
are called ‘socially tied assets’.  
 
The corporate mode of governance for housing corporations contains the following elements.  
The Board of Directors is responsible for the corporate policy, given the following restric-
tions: 
-  there exists a priori regulation based on the Woningwet 2001 (Ww) and the BBSH; 
-  there is a system of supervision and there exist sanctions; 
-  there are two financial funds for the sector: Centraal Fonds voor de Volkshuisvesting 
(CFV) and Waarborgfonds Sociale Woningbouw (WSW); 
-  there is a network of local relations (stakeholders). 
An admitted corporation has to adopt the following articles in its by-laws: 
-  there is a Board of Supervisors; 
-  this Board of Supervisors has to draw up a people’s housing report; 
-  there are rules to give tenants influence on the composition of the board; 
-  in case of dissolution of the corporation, its assets has to be distributed among other 
corporations or the municipality; its net capital has to be deposited in a central fund. 
The supervision by the central government was marginal and aimed at guaranteeing the conti-
nuity and solvability of the corporation by the CFV. The CFV calculates the surplus for many 
corporations, which part of the assets of a corporation could be spent on social purposes. In 
order to turn away the risk of direct political intervention, the Minister has urged the corpora-
tions to seriously plan spending this surplus on living quarters that lag behind in development 
and big problems are expected on the short term. In its annual report 2006, the CFV observes 
that the Boards of Supervisors of corporations are very slow in improving their performance, 
viz., their accountability towards society and their recruiting of board members. 
 
Recently the Association of Housing Corporations, Aedes, has issued two codes for its mem-
bers, viz.: 
-  The Aedes Code 
-  The Governance Code 
In the Aedes Code is stated that the governance code is compulsory. The Governance Code 
has resulted from an assignment by the VTW, the union of supervisors in Housing corpora-
tions, and Aedes to the Commissie Winters. The code of this committee is sharper and re-
quires more engagement than the Aedes Code.  
   17
Apart from the generic regulations in the Civil Code, housing corporations are also subject to 
the Woningwet (Ww) and the Besluit Beheer Sociale Huursector (BBSH 1993), a ministerial 
directive for the management of the social rent sector, issued by the Ministerie van Volkshuis-
vesting en Ruimtelijke Ordening (VROM), the Ministry of People’s Housing and Environ-
mental Design. The BBSH delineates: 
-  activities that housing corporations may undertake;  
-  policy domains upon which housing corporations may be active. 
This directive regulates the functioning and performance of housing corporations on six pol-
icy domains, which define the public tasks with which a housing corporation is charged. Al-
though the term ‘service of general interest’ is never used, it defines that service. The direc-
tive has been redesigned in 2004 requiring corporations to make a distinction between their 
core business, which is exempt from company taxes, and non-core or commercial services, 
such as broker services; these are subject to company taxes. The government, however, re-
mains responsible for the supervision chain. The basic supervision is carried out by internal 
supervision; external supervision is complementary.  
 
 
6  Conclusion  
 
In the introduction we mentioned the postmodernistic view that the classical, vertical democ-
racy is transforming to a horizontal network society with continuous bargaining between hy-
brid  organizations. Complementary to this development is  the  need  for transparency  of a 
mode of governance, for security when engaging in long term contracts, and for efficiency 
with its particular checks and balances. People appreciate a rational way to allocate power, 
included economic power, which is channeled by modes of governance. If that power is not 
properly allocated, misallocations of wealth and services follow. In this paper we have shown 
that the consecutive modes of governance in the Dutch social housing sector did not always 
match with the values that the sector was supposed to deliver. We propose and use a frame-
work that also facilitates the discussion about the concept of a social enterprise and the em-
bedding of a service of general interest. 
 
One conclusion of is that the expansion of non-core activities in the social housing sector and 
the underperformance in the core business is due to the vagueness and proliferation of the 
modes governance. The hybridization of governance has positive effects, such as a reformula-
tion and reshuffling of tasks and methods. But in order to make these innovations durable, 
new boundaries have to be delineated and a strong mode of governance has to be designed for 
the new type of organization, which is usually called a social enterprise.  
 
Another conclusion that is perhaps typical for the Netherlands is expressed by two questions. 
The first is: Who is the principal? That is, who has authority as a procurer (not as the execu-
tive provider on the various levels to enter into transactions, from whom it is received, and 
what are the consequences of underperformance? And the second question: How to solve the 
new type of government’s failure: inconsistency between the various allowed modes of gov-
ernance? For liberalizing and quasi-privatizing the social housing sector is inconsistent with 
simultaneously regulating rents. These and other problems have to be solved if one really 
wants to increase social welfare. 
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